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Something intriguing is going on within the political 
executive. In response to emerging conditions of 
governing in the late 20th and early 21st century in 
countries like New Zealand, some public servants are 
acting in new ways that are quite different from certain 
key prescriptions of the traditional, Westminster-derived 
constitutional framework on which our polity is based. 
The fact of these changes is interesting enough, but, 
surprisingly, few people talk about it – ‘surprisingly’ 
because these new ways of working cause tensions that 
are known (in tacit practice) but remain unacknowledged 
(in discourse). This paper identifies some of these 
changes and considers their implications.1
These emerging changes revolve around the manner 
in which public servants relate to and work in practice 
with clients, stakeholders, providers and others in ‘policy 
networks’, but in a manner that causes unresolved tensions 
for the offi cials involved. I argue that these shifts are entirely 
appropriate given the societal changes they refl ect, and, as 
such, should be regarded as democratically progressive; 
they signal another signifi cant development beyond our 
Westminster foundations and come at a time when it 
is important symbolically and constitutionally to look 
forward to the 21st century rather than backwards. On 
that basis, there is much to be gained by recognising these 
new realities and consciously articulating what we want and 
believe to be an Aoteaoroa/New Zealand way of governing, 
particularly regarding the relationships and activities that 
constitute the ‘public service’ and the ‘policy process’. 
It should be noted that this paper does not deal with 
the full array of recent and emerging changes to the 
Westminster foundations of our polity. Several of them 
(e.g. the shift away from a fi rst-past-the-post to a mixed-
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member-proportional electoral system; the role and 
function of associate ministers; the inclusion in cabinet 
of non-government ministers; the right of coalition 
parties in government to break with cabinet solidarity) 
have been noted and discussed elsewhere (e.g. Palmer 
and Palmer, 2004; White, 2005). 
The public servant according to 
Westminster
The classic Westminster image of the public servant is that 
of an anonymous, neutral and loyal offi cial, embedded 
in a set of hierarchical, rule-driven positions and 
practices, technically skilled in analysis, administration 
and management, and serving the government of the 
day by providing advice and implementing government 
decisions to the best of his or her ability (see, for example, 
Cabinet Office, 2001; State Services Commission, 
1995). Collectively, the public service is understood to 
be the technical arm of the political executive. 
This model contains certain assumptions about the policy 
process, the manner in which it is to be conducted and 
the role of the public servant in it. It assumes a linear and 
technical process that is closed and vertically-aligned. Public 
issues appear on the policy agenda via various routes (e.g. 
research fi ndings drawn to the attention of government, 
party manifestos, public controversies to which government 
is forced to respond) but, at a certain point, the minister 
of cabinet commits to and prioritises particular issues. 
Public servants then research these issues, and identify 
and test various options to deal with them. They conduct 
research and analysis – the expert application of various 
theories and methodologies to aid decision making – and 
present the outputs of their deliberations to the ministry. 
Ministers consider these options, fi ltering them with 
their ideologies, values and electoral concerns, and reach 
a decision, which public servants then implement. In that 
sense, the Westminster-based policy process combines 
1 In contrast to much public administration analysis, this analysis 
focuses on enacted practice rather than the institutional framework. 
In that respect, this analysis is sociological and political in perspective 
and focuses on the (often tacit) rules of action underlying the work 
of public servants (Giddens, 1984).
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technical and political rationality within the executive, 
the public servant constituted according to the former 
and the minister according to the latter, with the former 
subordinated to the latter.
Policy analysis and advising is ‘backroom’ work. Even 
the implementation of policy as traditionally defi ned, 
wherein a much higher proportion of work is ‘front 
counter’, open to public gaze and subject to interpersonal 
infl uences, it is prescribed in terms of technical expertise 
in administration of legislation, its application in 
particular cases, and the accountable management of 
resources and systems. External relationships such as 
consultation over policy with interested parties – usually 
also experts or representatives, and occasionally clients or 
representatives advocating on their behalf – is handled 
by ministers and not public servants. 
It has been argued for some time that New Zealand had 
preserved a remarkably ‘pure’ version of the Westminster 
conventions in its political system, but developments 
such as the introduction of associate ministers, the 
replacement of the fi rst-past-the-post electoral system 
and the qualifi cation of cabinet solidarity indicate that 
this is no longer the case. Equally, from the 1970s 
onwards some intra-executive relationships took on a 
character quite unlike the simple subordination of the 
classic, abstract model: certain ministers understood 
the value of internal and robust debate between 
themselves and senior offi cials, relied on their mutual 
interdependence, and realised the benefi ts to be gained 
by balancing technical and value-based decision criteria. 
In these cases, depending on the issue, the minister–
senior official relationship was one of ‘teamwork’, 
albeit one wherein the minister would have the last 
word (James, 2002). Equally, beyond focusing merely 
on technicalities, senior offi cials would often exercise a 
degree of ‘nous’ in reading the broad social, economic 
and political context before offering their advice (not the 
partisan politicisation of advice but a calculation of what 
might be achievable given the context). And as ‘interest 
group politics’ became accepted, offi cials sometimes 
maintained working relationships, albeit at arm’s length, 
with peak professional, industry, provider and client 
groups and/or their representatives as required, on behalf 
of the minister. Later, as ‘new public management’ took 
hold, senior offi cials became more used to being in the 
public limelight of parliamentary and media scrutiny 
and lost some of their anonymity as a result.
In short, in the final decades of the 20th century 
anonymity, neutrality and loyalty for senior offi cials 
took on more complex, nuanced meanings, and in some 
cases diminished, and the line between politics and 
administration blurred signifi cantly, although did not 
disappear. On the other hand, where newly-appointed 
ministerial advisers became increasingly prominent in 
developing new policies for government, some senior 
offi cials came to feel they were being pushed back into 
a role closer to the classic prescription, although in 
other situations collaboration between advisers and 
offi cials may now becoming more common (Eichbaum 
and Shaw, 2005). Further, whilst the so-called ‘New 
Zealand model of public management’ freed up chief 
executives and senior managers in various managerial 
respects, they were still bound into a variation on the 
classic Westminster theme of formal subordination to 
the minister via output-focused performance contracts. 
As a broad generalisation, therefore, we can say that 
Westminster-derived constitutional principles continued 
to underpin minister–senior offi cial relationships – and 
set the top-down framework for the conduct of offi cials 
more generally – at least until very recent times, and 
probably still do (James, 2002). 
The shifts in public sector practice focused on in 
this paper, however, are not emerging in the direct 
relationships between ministers and senior offi cials. 
They are arising in the complex relationships emerging 
between lower-level offi cials and others involved in the 
policy process. As will be seen shortly, some of these 
reveal characteristics that are not consistent with the 
details of the classic model identifi ed above, although it 
is diffi cult to be precise on this point. Documents that 
might be expected to articulate the norms of offi cial 
conduct, such as the State Services Commission’s Public 
Service Principles or the current Cabinet Manual, seem 
to be silent when it comes to the operational detail, 
and present what seem to be principles derived logically 
from the overall political relationships at the core of 
the Westminster conventions.2 The point raised by 
this paper, however, is that these emerging changes are 
altering the realities of public service in contemporary 
2 It should also be noted that the current Cabinet Manual has not 
been updated since 2001 and the SSC Principles, Conventions 
and Practice guidance series documents have been withdrawn from 
the SSC website (see http://www.ssc.govt.nz/display/GlossaryItem.
asp?id=104&this_window) on the basis that ‘a considerable amount 
of content relating to process and practice is no longer current’. 
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New Zealand from the bottom up. As Colin James in 
The Tie That Binds (2002, p.75) has noted:
The principles do seem to have lost some of 
their force and/or no longer to describe actual 
practice. This risks incredulity and disrespect 
among lower-level public servants.
The contributors to The Tie That Binds felt generally 
that there was no need for a ‘reformulation’ of these 
principles. This paper, however, argues otherwise.
Emerging trends: offi cials in policy 
networks
Empirically, today the precise form of the policy process 
in any instance varies according to the government of the 
day, the particular minister, the government and non-
government agencies involved, and the complexity and 
public interest in a particular policy fi eld. There are some 
cases wherein the process is remarkably like the simple, 
classic model; others look like a teamwork model.
However, there are ample signs in New Zealand now of 
what seems like a quite different approach, wherein the 
constituent relationships and practices – and, hence, the 
role of the public servant – are quite different. These 
pockets of emerging practice are found primarily in 
arenas where groups of citizens have a strong interest in 
public policy and participate as professionals and experts 
in their own right; and where government agencies (the 
leading agency and others, including other levels of 
government) are involved necessarily in extensive and 
intensive relationships with individuals and groups. Any 
and all of clients, stakeholders, providers, intermediaries, 
representatives, researchers, observers, advocates, critics 
and opponents may be involved. These relationships are 
played out in multiple settings in interactions large and 
small, and occur in a constant buzz of activity. These 
are the newly emerging ‘policy networks’. They can 
be found in policy development, implementation and 
evaluation, and in a wide range of policy arenas, such as 
social policy, including health and education; in policy 
relating to children, family and the aged; taxation; justice 
and corrections; regional and economic development; in 
local government, and in the community sector.
Sometimes, depending on whether they choose to 
remain above or to join in the fray, ministers, their 
advisers and relevant parliamentary committee members 
will also participate directly in these networks in non-
parliamentary settings (e.g. conferences and seminars). 
Otherwise, they play their constituted role as decision 
makers in the formal setting of Parliament or cabinet, 
a setting wherein relationships between the minister 
and public servant are more traditional; but, since 
these places too are increasingly part of a continuum 
of spaces wherein the policy network functions, neither 
can escape the legacy of obligations built up within and 
around the network, and which impinges upon both 
the public servant and the minister in defi nite and 
determining ways.
In short, we are seeing the emergence in New Zealand 
of policy networks as a significant and sometimes 
essential vehicle for realising the policy process – a widely 
discussed development in contemporary democracies 
(e.g. Howlett and Ramesh, 1995; see also Rhodes, 
1997; Sabatier, 1988; for a New Zealand discussion and 
examples of the emergence and character of networks, 
Gray, 2002; and Ministry of Social Development, 
2003). What is not often discussed, however, are the 
assumptions, practices and effects of policy networks, 
particularly in relation to the changing role of the 
public servant, the constitutional implications of 
these developments, their appropriateness for the 21st 
century, and how we should approach them – which is 
what this paper tries to do.3
Sociological realities in policy 
networks: the social (re)constitution 
of networked offi cials
It is a simple sociological fact that individuals may 
enter into new types of relationships in a particular, 
previously constituted role but, to establish and build 
these new relationships, they will need to negotiate 
new rules of behaviour with other participants that will 
necessarily modify aspects of their pre-existing role. And 
to maintain and build these relationships over time, they 
will need to reproduce these new ways of acting to the 
point where they become routinised, internalised and 
experienced as mutual obligations (i.e. as new or variant 
role prescriptions). They will be penalised by the other 
participants if these new ways of acting are not repeated. 
3 The following discusses the characteristics of policy networks as 
‘ideal-types’: i.e. presents them in the form of typifi cations that 
capture the essential features of the phenomenon in focus, as 
abstracted from known instances. In that respect the typology is 
‘idealised’. Few empirical instances will evidence all of these imputed 
features or the internal coherence implied by this analysis. 
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Moreover, if these new role prescriptions are carried over 
into other roles, contradictions and confl icts can arise 
in those settings.
This paper argues that this effect is having an impact 
on public servants as they participate increasingly in 
today’s policy networks. They are fi nding that, to be 
effective in the complex world of policy, they must act 
in ways that go beyond the traditional prescriptions 
and proscriptions, which, as previously noted, tend to 
focus on minister/government–offi cial relationships 
and say little about the operational realities of the 
policy process. Inevitably, this effect is feeding back 
into conceptions of ‘how to act’ as a public servant, 
making some of the founding principles seem unreal 
and unhelpful. Consequently, signifi cant tensions arise 
that, at this point in time, are not being publicly aired 
and, therefore, not being resolved. Without this, public 
servants in networks will continue working in ways that 
are constitutionally defi nable as ‘risky’, ‘inappropriate’ 
and even ‘disloyal’ (so they will continue to keep their 
heads below the parapets) when, in fact, what they are 
doing is acting entirely appropriately given emerging 
changes in the relationship between civil society 
and government in the 21st century, and should be 
applauded and built on.
In order to demonstrate how and why this situation 
has arisen, it is necessary to identify some observable 
sociological and political features of ‘working in policy 
networks’ and the origins of these recent developments.
1. Policy networks are extensive, intensive and 
porous and extend beyond the political executive 
Policy networks emerge as loose but self-conscious 
collectivities intensively engaged in a particular fi eld 
of policy, usually centred in and around one or more 
government agencies. There is usually an active core 
membership, shading out into others whose engagement 
is more occasional. Membership is usually inclusive 
and extensive, comprising public servants who work 
in that fi eld (including those from lead and other 
agencies) as well as providers, intermediaries, clients and 
stakeholders (including opponents). In other words, any 
policy network is not contained within one agency, even 
if it is centred there; it may fl ow across several and out 
into civil society and/or the economy (which is what 
gives networks their horizontal and lateral features). And 
their boundaries are often porous, unlike bureaucratic 
organisations that seek to defi ne and close their edges. 
The trend towards formation of policy networks seems 
most apparent in (but may not be limited to) areas where 
policy is complex, uncertain, and crosses the traditional 
divisions between government agencies and relies on the 
cooperation of multiple participants, including those 
who are formally ‘outside’ government.
2. Relationships within policy networks tend 
to be fl at, collaborative and web-like
Networks are built on ‘partnerships’4 and not ‘hierarchies’. 
Even if centred on one or more government agencies, the 
offi cials involved are not usually ‘in command’ (they may 
be ‘leaders’, but in the 21st-century sense of ‘leading’: see 
OECD, 2001a). Nor are they ‘arm’s length’. Even though 
the public servants participate offi cially as delegates of 
the minister and bearers of government’s goals and 
objectives, and must sometimes seek to infl uence action 
in certain directions, there is a genuine interdependence 
and mutual reliance between all members in defi ning the 
problem and developing, implementing and evaluating 
solutions. They may provide the network with overall 
strategic goals, indicating the political, budgetary and 
managerial givens, and steer the process towards a certain 
framework of goals given by government priorities, but 
the relationships between network members are more 
like those between peers and colleagues, with web-like 
rather than pyramidal patterns of interaction (Gray, 
2002; see also OECD, 2001b). 
3. Much of the work in policy networks pro-
ceeds via collective policy learning 
Rather than being driven principally by research 
conducted by professional experts in back rooms, which 
is then assessed according to abstract decision criteria, 
partly because the public problems being dealt with are 
complex, multidimensional and multi-causal, policy 
development (and implementation and evaluation) 
in networks works in a mode more akin to a recursive 
journey of discovery than to the diagrams of a policy 
process textbook. Confronted by issues for which there 
4 This word is in wide currency, yet may be misleading. Network 
members usually defi ne each other as ‘partners’ and enact relatively 
equal relationships. Ultimately, however, the mandate of the elected 
government can be invoked, at which point offi cials, as delegates of 
the minister, will reassert authority or their vertical accountabilities, 
often with damaging consequences. There seems little doubt that 
non-government members of policy networks increasingly expect 
power relationships in the policy process to be equalised in fact and 
not just in rhetoric.
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are no easy answers, policy networks seek to explore 
and learn collectively, puzzling over the unknowns, 
envisaging scenarios, constructing hypotheses for action, 
trying them out and monitoring and evaluating the 
journey of discovery – a process more akin to ‘trialling’ 
and ‘learning by doing’ than to ‘fi nding correct or 
scientifi cally-justifi able answers and applying them’. 
Experiential understanding and practical know-how 
brought by practitioners are valued and exploited as 
much as the technical input provided by professional 
researchers and evaluators. Multiple problem defi nitions 
and plural answers are recognised and taken as normal. 
Plausibility, precedence and achievability more than 
‘(scientifi c) truth’ are key decision criteria. ‘What works 
in practice?’ becomes the grail. 
4. Public servants participate in policy net-
works as information brokers and resource fa-
cilitators with lateral obligations to the other 
members of the network
Formally, public servants participate in these policy 
networks as delegates of the minister, but the very 
character of the network relationships, the internal 
interdependence of the members and the exploratory 
nature of the work, means that, to be effective, public 
servants cannot simply enact that role. They cannot act 
in removed or distant or controlling ways, preserving the 
pristine elements of their role as ‘public servant’. Network 
relationships are face-to-face, are built on engagement 
in a collective journey of puzzling, learning and strategy 
and are underpinned by a constant fl ow backwards and 
forwards of ideas, discussion, activities and documents 
in which public servants act as facilitators and brokers. 
Even where public servants bring knowledge of 
government intentions or comprehensive research or 
evaluation, they must and do engage with network 
members as something approaching ‘partners in policy’. 
In doing so, they create mutual sets of lateral professional 
and knowledge-sharing obligations and responsibilities 
with other network members, obligations that can 
cut across those to ministers and cabinet (e.g. where 
government wants one thing but the answers emerging 
from the network propose another).
The critical thing about these developments is that 
for public servants engaged in policy networks, the 
relationships and interactions in which they participate 
and the social rules and professional practices through 
which they conduct their work are signifi cantly different 
from those presupposed by logical derivation from 
classical Westminster conventions, or even the more 
nuanced forms that emerged in the 1970s and 80s.5 
Policy networks are an organic form of organisation 
– in contrast to the mechanical form presupposed 
by Westminster – that are open, porous and semi-
public rather than closed, impermeable and secret. 
The members interact as collaborators and peers; in 
effect, the non-government members become akin to 
partners within and around the political executive. For 
public servants, accountability to the minister remains a 
paramount principle, but it is now so surrounded with 
other obligations that core principles, no matter how 
often repeated, provide little guidance on how to act 
appropriately or how to reduce the stresses. 
Origins of these emerging realities: so-
ciety and government
Why is it that complex policy processes seem to be 
increasingly organised in and around policy networks, 
and that public servants are active participants in them as 
facilitators and brokers in a web of mutual relationships, 
rather than exclusively as emissaries of the government 
of the day, as technical experts in the service of the 
ministry? Where and why and how have these new 
realities emerged? The explanation is important, since 
it infl uences whether we should defi ne them as positive 
or negative.6 Two possibilities can be identifi ed: the fi rst 
is as a response to increasing demands for participation 
in the policy process; the second, as a response to 
the problems of knowledge posed by complex public 
problems. 
1. The extension of political rights and the 
demand for participation
With the progressive expansion of political rights in 
20th-century social and liberal democracies, more and 
5 It is possible that related shifts have occurred in relationships of public 
servants with (a) parliamentarians in select committees; (b) associate 
and non-government ministers in briefi ng cabinet committees; and 
(c) clients in case management – in the last case, including a new 
type of obligation (of service provision, as in service charters) that 
exists nowhere in the traditions of Westminster and yet which is a 
21st-century reality. These are not explored in this paper.
6 For example, some observers might criticise these developments as 
self-serving ‘interest group politics’. Public choice theorists might see 
them as ‘rent-seeking behaviour’ by non-government interests and 
consider the possibility of ‘capture’. As is clear from the following, I offer 
an alternative explanation and see these trends in positive terms.
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more citizens in their various roles demanded the right 
of input into matters of policy that affected them. The 
extension of suffrage to working adult males, then adult 
females, the rights of indigenous peoples, second-wave 
feminism, the conservation movement and recent talk 
of the rights of children and animals are illustrations. 
This trend continues (and has combined with the 
‘open government’ movement that commenced in 
the 1970s). Less and less are citizens individually and 
collectively willing to have decisions thrust upon them; 
they demand the right at least to be consulted, and, 
increasingly, to participate in (and, conversely, to oppose 
and undermine) policy development, implementation 
and evaluation. As citizens force their way into policy 
through various forms of civil association, governments 
are fi nding it necessary and helpful to include them 
– necessary in recognising new claims to power based 
on the mobilisation of political rights, and helpful in 
the sense that they are better able to understand the 
issues and claim legitimacy for their decisions. Some 
of these new interactions occur around ministers, 
advisers and political parties, and some around and 
with state servants in their roles as policy advisers and 
implementers. Policy networks are the effect of these 
new patterns of interactions and blur the boundaries 
between the governors and the governed.
2. Problems of knowing and acting
Increasingly, the public problems to which government 
is expected to respond are complex, multi-factorial and 
look different from different perspectives. They can 
also appear recalcitrant, inexplicable and intractable 
(Ryan, 2003). The public sector knowledge sets and 
policy capabilities available to government tend to 
be indirect, technical and abstract, based as they are 
on standard forms of social science research and the 
application of academic disciplines to problem solving. 
Effective policy action demands that direct, experiential 
knowledge of the various dimensions of the issues and 
possible solutions is brought into the policy process, 
partly because it has the validity of direct experience and 
practical know-how, but also because complex problems 
with multiple causes need to be understood from diverse 
and relative viewpoints. This is also because scientifi cally 
credible knowledge is not necessarily useful or applicable 
knowledge; effective policy also needs non-positivist 
knowledge of practice and the conditions under 
which practice occurs, and is often better developed 
through action than discourse. Particularly when they 
stretch over policy development, implementation 
and evaluation, policy networks provide one way of 
combining conceptual and practice knowledge and 
creating ways of applying one to the other.7
In general, then, we can see that the rise and character 
of policy networks, and, more particularly, the practices 
that constitute today’s public servants involved in them, 
has been a natural development, occurring partly as 
the polity responds to changes in the broader society; 
they are as much a product of government being ‘acted 
upon’ as government ‘acting’. They are also a result of 
collective learning over time in the political executive. 
They have contributed to making the policy process 
more open, transparent and inclusive and less secret, and 
have pluralised and diffused the capacity to defi ne and 
decide, all positive values from an ‘open government’ 
perspective. The public servant is at the centre of new 
sets of relationships and activities that involve a wider 
range of agents than previously, bringing more complex 
horizontal and lateral openings and obligations to bear 
that muddy the simple vertical and functional image 
of the ‘technical arm of the executive’, yet which seem 
essential to the functioning of a modern democracy.
They are natural developments in the constitutional 
relationships that make up the Aotearoa/New Zealand 
political system, and, in these respects at least, create a 
different power map to the traditional one. They are 
natural developments for sure, but not uncontested 
ones: governments have not always taken kindly to 
incursions by civil groupings into the policy process and 
are still inclined to assert the power of their perceived 
mandate when regarded as necessary. At such times, 
state servants in policy networks can fi nd themselves 
to be the proverbial meat in the sandwich, in situations 
of considerable tension and risk. Where the stakes are 
high, we see attempts at reassertion of the ‘traditional’ 
line designed to ensure that state servants do not cross 
a certain line. The reminder to public servants by the 
state services commissioner at the time of the hikoi 
in April 2004, whilst nuanced, is probably a good 
example (Wintringham, 2004); it drew attention to 
the convention of not supporting groups that opposed 
government policy, yet made it diffi cult for those public 
7 It also seems likely that a mature ‘managing for outcomes’ would 
strengthen these developments (Ryan, 2003).
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servants (particularly Mäori) who maintained other 
types of network relationships with those who were on 
the streets. 
Overall, though, it is not hard to argue that these are 
no more than recent steps in a long journey towards 
democratisation in which exclusive executive power is 
gradually reduced and the power of civil society and its 
parliamentary representation is progressively expanded – 
not in a zero-sum way, but so that a society can consider 
public problems in all their complexity. In that sense, 
the shift towards policy networks, the pluralisation of 
the power to decide and the reconstitution of the public 
servant as policy process resource and facilitator are to 
be celebrated rather than cause for concern.
Beyond ‘Westminster’: talk ‘Aotearoa/
New Zealand’
This paper argues that emerging forces impacting on and 
changing the constitutional role of public servants are 
natural developments resulting from ongoing changes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand society. These forces seem likely 
to continue into the foreseeable future. In so far as these 
extend democracy and benefi t the public good (and I 
would argue that they do), they are to be supported, 
even though they present considerable challenges to the 
structure and practice of public service and executive 
government.
The conventions of Westminster maintain a hold on our 
understandings of how best to relate the public service 
and cabinet. Yet, in truth, the core conventions apply at 
a high level of generality and speak to the relationships 
only between ministers and senior offi cials. The policy 
process these days is no longer the hermetic preserve 
of the executive, with public servants now engaged in 
extensive and intensive relationships with a wide range 
of government and non-government participants. Yet 
those founding conventions offer little guidance on how 
best to act. Some of our best up-and-coming public 
servants are struggling with the new realities, trying to 
respond appropriately to the more extensive demands 
emerging from civil society and to work in more effective 
and engaged ways, yet, while doing so, feel they are 
taking political risks. This is so primarily because the 
offi cial touchstones are a collection of conventions 
forged in a different place and at a former time. There 
is no collective expression of these new realities, or even 
useful and ongoing discussion of societal changes, of 
what sort of polity we want to have, what we want our 
public servants to be and how we want them to act – in 
fact, we tend to shy away from anything that has a ring 
of ‘constitutional debate’. 
In order to grant permission to those who are trying to 
fi nd new and 21st-century ways of conducting the policy 
process, and to enable discussion of what does and does 
not work or seem appropriate, we need to acknowledge 
and be open about the fact that public servants and 
citizens in various roles are treading new ground. We 
are, in fact, creating an Aotearoa/New Zealand system of 
government. The future, in this respect, is not something 
to be feared but something to be collectively constructed 
as our journey continues. It is time for the debate.
References
Cabinet Offi ce (2001) Cabinet Manual, Wellington: 
Cabinet Offi ce, Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet
Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2005) ‘Why we should 
all be nicer to ministerial advisers’, Policy Quarterly, 1 
(4), pp.18-25
Giddens, A. (1984) The Social Constitution of Society, 
Cambridge: Polity Press
Gray, A. (2002) Integrated Service Delivery and Regional 
Co-ordination: a literature review, Wellington: Gray 
Matter Research Ltd, accessed from http://www.msd.
govt.nz/work-areas/cross-sectoral-work/mosaics.html
Howlett, M. and M. Ramesh (1995) Studying Public 
Policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press
James, C. (2002) The Tie That Binds: the relationship 
between ministers and chief executives, Wellington: 
Institute of Policy Studies 
Ministry of Social Development (2003) Mosaics, 
Whakaahua Papariki: Key Findings and Good Practice 
Guide for Regional Co-ordination and Integrated Service 
Delivery, Wellington: MSD, accessed from http://www.
msd.govt.nz/work-areas/cross-sectoral-work/mosaics.
html
OECD (2001a) Public Sector Leadership for the 21st 
Century, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
OECD (2001b) Citizens as Partners: information, 
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
06
47
consultation and public participation in policy-making, 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
Palmer, G. and M. Palmer (2004) Bridled Power: New 
Zealand’s constitution and government, South Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press
Rhodes, R. (1997) Understanding Governance: policy 
networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability, 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press
Ryan, B. (2003) Learning MFO: managing for outcomes: 
the Queensland case, Brisbane: Institute of Public 
Administration Australia
Sabatier, P. (1988) ‘An advocacy coalition framework of 
policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning 
therein’, Policy Sciences, 21, pp.129-68
State Services Commission (1995) Public Service 
Principles, Conventions and Practice, Wellington: State 
Services Commission
White, N. (2005) ‘Deconstructing cabinet collective 
solidarity’, Policy Quarterly, 1 (4), pp.4-11
Wintringham, M. (2004) ‘The foreshore and seabed 
policy – hikoi’, Wellington: State Services Commission, 
accessable at http://www.ssc.govt.nz/display/document.
asp?docid=3826 
Bill Ryan is an Associate Professor 
in the School of  Government at 
Victoria University of  Wellington. 
His primary research interests lie in 
the broad area of  governance and 
public management. He is currently 
Director of  Programmes within the 
School of  Government.
INDIRECT TAXES IN 
NEW ZEALAND
An Institute of Policy Studies publication
by John Creedy and Cath Sleeman
Indirect Taxes in New Zealand presents the 
results of new empirical analyses relating to 
indirect taxation in New Zealand. The authors 
examine in detail the equity and effi ciency effects 
of the existing tax system, and a range of policy 
reforms. These reforms include the abolition of 
excise taxes along with an increase in the GST 
rate, an increase in petrol taxation, and the impo-
sition of carbon tax.
John Creedy and Cath Sleeman’s analyses use 
economic models that allow for the fact that 
households change their consumption patterns 
when indirect patterns and prices change. 
John Creedy is the Truby Williams Professor of 
Economics at Melbourne University. Cath Sleeman 
is an analyst at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Published  - July 2006
Format – B5 Paperback, pp 137
ISBN – 1-877347-11-6
Price - $25.00 (incl P&P within NZ)
To have a copy of Indirect Taxes in New Zealand 
and an invoice sent to you please email, phone, 
fax or mail your order to
Institute of Policy Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
Email ipos@vuw.ac.nz
Telephone +64 4 463 5307
Fax +64 4 463 7413
PO Box 600, Wellington
New Zealand 
